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Antitrust analysis of supermarkets: global 






This paper reviews the basic components of antitrust analysis for the supermarket
industry, including deﬁnition of product and geographic markets and the measure-
ment of market power. The analysis of prices and proﬁts in a market structure context
remains important, especially in countries such as Australia with very high supermar-
ket concentration. Firm and brand level New Empirical Industrial Organisation mod-
els of demand and oligopoly pricing also provide insights for evaluating antitrust
claims. Recent research on vertical pricing games and price transmission expand the
analysis to market channel pricing issues, including coalescing power by supermarkets
and food manufacturers. The issues and approaches explained in this paper are rele-




 market concentration, market deﬁnition, Nash–Bertrand conduct, price–cost 




Supermarkets are truly a global phenomenon. Over the past decade, food
systems seem to be converging towards a hybrid of North American and
European practices. European researchers predict that as few as three or four
truly global multinational supermarket companies, for example, Carrefour,
Royal Ahold, and Wal-Mart, will serve as channel captains for the distribu-




. 2005). Whether or
not this degree of consolidation occurs remains an open question. Given the
trend towards few large supermarket ﬁrms in many developed economies,
one has an increasing need for antitrust analysis. Trusts (monopolies and
cartels) at the advent of the 20th century gave rise to the antitrust movement
in law and economics. Antitrust analysis is more speciﬁc than research on
pricing and general industry performance. It is directed at analysis of the
status of competition with the intent to enforce a country’s competition laws.
The primary thesis of this paper is that antitrust analysis of supermarkets
is a global concern; however, a common economic approach plays out in
local markets rather than the global economy. There is considerable research
on the Australian situation. Grifﬁth (2004) and the Parliament of the Com-
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policy options. The Australian supermarket industry is now dominated by
two large chains, Coles and Woolworths. Although Australia is a very large
country, only a relatively small area is densely populated and at 20 million,
its population is less than half that of Great Britain or California. When
combined with the prerogatives of distribution efﬁciency and management
scale economies, it is not surprising that the Australian supermarket sector is
highly concentrated. One can ﬁnd similar concentration levels in similar-
sized population areas of the USA and UK.
Antitrust or competition laws are designed to deter non-competitive con-
duct in such industrial structures. A key issue is the deﬁnition of relevant
‘antitrust markets’, which can be different from the general conception of the
scope of an industrial market. The size of the market to a large extent deter-
mines ﬁrm market shares that in turn can inﬂuence the pricing power that
ﬁrms have. Antitrust analysis is also concerned with possible efﬁciencies and
variations in quality, including product variety that may come with large-
scale, even dominant ﬁrms.
This paper reports on antitrust research in the USA and UK and suggests
avenues for research on Australian supermarkets. It is organised as follows.
First, horizontal antitrust analysis is reviewed. Important subtopics include
product and geographic market deﬁnition, market structure, and the meas-
urement of unilateral and coordinated market power in empirical models
that can also measure the price impact of cost efﬁciencies and variation in the




  Then the focus is on vertical market channel
issues. This includes vertical market pricing, vertical foreclosure, the exercise
of buyer power by supermarkets, and price transmission in imperfectly com-
petitive market channels.
 
2. Measurement of horizontal market power in the supermarket industry
 
Market power allows a ﬁrm to set price and other terms of trade rather than
responding to price and other terms that are set by the market’s ‘invisible
hand’. Market power is an issue in horizontal and vertical merger policy in
nearly all countries. Mergers that tend to substantially lessen competition,
that is, increase the exercise of market power, are often prohibited (US DOJ
1984; FTC and DOJ 1997; ACCC 1999; Commission of the European Com-
munities 2004). Monopolisation and anticompetitive pricing practices, includ-
ing dominant ﬁrm pricing and price ﬁxing cartels, are other areas of concern.
 
2.1. Market deﬁnition and concentration in relevant antitrust markets
 
The relevant market for measurement of horizontal market power has two




  A more comprehensive review would include research on barriers to entry (Cotterill and
Haller 1992) and the effect of ﬁnancial leverage on product market competition (Chevalier
1995). 
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ﬁnd a set of products or a geographic area to be an antitrust market if a
hypothetical monopolist who controls all commerce in the set or area can
elevate price by a small, but signiﬁcant non-transitory amount in a proﬁtable
fashion. (FTC and DOJ 1997, p. 6). In other words, buyers lack alternative
sources of supply that would defeat the price increase.
Since 1979, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has maintained that
supermarket sales are the relevant product market for supermarkets, not
some broader category of food purchases. Today, the supermarket sales prod-
uct market deﬁnition includes the supermarket component of hypermarkets,
such as Wal-Mart supercentres, but it does not include sales from wholesale
or club stores, such as Sam’s, Costco, or BJ’s, or limited assortment stores,
such as Aldi. The UK Competition Commission has conﬁrmed a similar
product market deﬁnition process for analysis of market power questions in
the UK supermarket industry. ‘We conclude that the market is for one-stop
grocery shopping carried out in stores of 1400 square metres (about 15 000
square feet) or more’ (Competition Commission 2000, p. 2).
The Australian Parliament’s study of food retailing ‘Fair Market or Mar-
ket Failure’ took no position on the relevant product market, but noted that
it had a strong inﬂuence on the position of the nation’s top three chains. The
Woolworths, Coles, and Franklin supermarket chains captured only 43 per
cent of ‘total take-home food and liquor’ (The Parliament of the Common-
wealth of Australia 1999, p. 41). The Parliament of the Commonwealth of
Australia (1999) used census data to ﬁnd that the (then) top three supermarkets
had 75.4 per cent of the grocery market (includes smaller stores and conven-
ience stores) in 1997–1998. Neither of these conforms to current US or UK
product market deﬁnition for supermarkets. In 2005, with the demise of the
third ranked chain, Franklins, the top two, Coles and Woolworths, account
for over 75 per cent of grocery sales and an even higher share of supermarket
sales in Australia.
Geographic markets for the sale of supermarket products are inherently
local, not regional or national. Most consumers frequent supermarkets
within a few kilometres of their home. ‘One-stop shopping patterns are pri-
marily local with consumers rarely traveling more than 10 min in urban areas
and rarely more than 15 min elsewhere to do their main weekly shopping’
(Competition Commission 2000, p. 2). Store trading areas, however, overlap
in urban areas. Geographic barriers such as rivers, demographic barriers such
as racially segmented urban neighbourhoods, and the population density in
urban areas are features that deﬁne geographic markets that are larger than
individual store trading areas but smaller than large metropolitan areas. News-
print advertising circulation areas can also affect the geographic scope of
supermarket competition. Some large metropolitan papers have different
advertisement sections for different sections of the metropolitan area.
As in other countries, Australia’s supermarket concentration in many cities
is even higher than national concentration (see The Parliament of the Com-
monwealth of Australia 1999, p. 14 chart). Further research to reﬁne product 
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and geographic market deﬁnition in Australia is critical for analysis of com-
petition. Consumer surveys that analyse where groceries are purchased and
consumer switching conduct among large supermarket, convenience stores,
and other food outlets are feasible and desirable. One must also measure
price and quality perceptions and correlate them to switching behaviour to
obtain insight on the ability of any groups of ﬁrms in a particular area to ele-
vate price proﬁtably. In the USA and Europe, A.C. Nielsen and Information
Resources Inc. maintain very large household panel databases that are useful
guides to market deﬁnition. Supermarket operators also routinely analyse the
trade area for individual stores to determine where and under what condi-
tions consumers shop at the store. Without access to such databases, a
researcher can conduct on-site, mail, or telephone surveys targeted to a par-
ticular metropolitan area to determine the market landscape. A researcher
can also examine supermarket advertising conduct in newspapers to obtain
insight on market scope and pricing conduct.
 
2.2. Competitive effects analysis
 
Only recently have European and Anglo-American analysis of market power
effects converged to a common framework. Traditionally, Anglo-American
analysis focused upon what is now called coordinated effects (FTC and DOJ
1997). Today in Washington, the unwritten rule is that one needs at least
three ﬁrms in an antitrust market for effective competition, that is, no coordin-




. (2003a) describe how US and European
Union antitrust agencies currently analyse coordinated effects. High con-
centrations, with high barriers to entry, are necessary but not sufﬁcient to
establish tacit collusion. The agencies look for facilitating practices that have
no justiﬁcation in a competitive market as evidence of deviation from com-
petitive conduct.
In the European Union, the original antitrust focus was on what is now
called unilateral effects. Recently, the dominant ﬁrm approach has been gen-
eralised to analyse margins and more generally market power in differenti-




. 2003b). As the number of ﬁrms (brands)
in a differentiated product market declines, a ﬁrm’s perceived demand curve
becomes less elastic and the optimal price and price–cost margin increases. A
ﬁrm (brand) manager unilaterally elevates price, thereby creating an antitrust





how to estimate and use elasticities to determine whether a merger is between
brands that are close substitutes and so leads to elevated prices. This model
is sufﬁciently ﬂexible to include estimates of merger-related cost savings and
their impact on pricing. As we show below, this approach to differentiated
product pricing can address supermarket as well as food manufacturer pricing
power.
Returning to the retail supermarket industry, empirical analysis over the
past 30 years illustrates how much, or how little, we know about coordinated 
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and unilateral effects in local antitrust markets and how analysis of market




. (1979) designed a study of the supermarket
industry for the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress to evaluate
the Demsetz efﬁciency as well as the market power hypothesis. Using local
market price–cost margins for individual chains, they estimated several con-
centration–proﬁt models. They generally found positive and signiﬁcant rela-
tionships in several different datasets, including one that focused upon the
proﬁtability of a single ﬁrm’s operations (A & P) across many local markets.
Such intraﬁrm studies focus most squarely on local market power and efﬁ-
ciency effects because they abstract from interﬁrm variation in accounting
and ﬁnancial practices, managerial practices, vertical integration, buying
power, and also quality and product variety issues such as private label, store
layout, and merchandising practices.
To  determine whether the higher proﬁts in more concentrated local mar-




. (1979) constructed and analysed local market price indices and found





 Higher prices, not Demsetz efﬁciency, was the source of higher
proﬁts in larger ﬁrms in more concentrated markets.
Since then, concentration–price studies in several other local market indus-
tries report similar results. In response, Demsetz and others advanced what
has become known as the Demsetz quality critique. They note that a positive
concentration or market share price relationship could be due to larger ﬁrms
having higher quality products in a differentiated product industry such as
food retailing (Anderson 1993). Cotterill (1986), however, ﬁnds a strong intra-
ﬁrm share–price relationship for each of two supermarket chains that operated
in several local markets. Since ‘quality’ is reasonably uniform across a chain
store’s operations in several local markets, these share–price correlations are
not due to quality. Cotterill (1999) explicitly modelled quality (store charac-
teristics and service levels) jointly with prices in a simultaneous equations
system to test the Demsetz quality and market power hypotheses. Controlling
for quality effects, concentration, and market share continued to be positively
related to price.
Very few of these concentration–price studies controlled for market struc-
ture endogeneity. Yet Froeb and Werden (1991) found that the bias in price





, no relationship was found between market share and
price at the store level; however, a strong positive relationship existed when




  Many commonly available price indices, such as the US Consumer Price Index, are not
constructed in a fashion that measures antitrust price phenomena. One must measure prices
on a ﬁxed set of products, and one must aggregate them into weighted price indices that reﬂect
the importance of each product in the representative consumers’ grocery basket. Geithman
and Marion (1993) is an excellent source for understanding price aggregation procedures. 
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UK Competition Commission curiously tested only store-level models. They
report that local market structure matters for pricing at Tesco, but not Safe-
way.  Sainsbury, the other leading UK chain, submitted no store-level price
data (Competition Commission 2000, p. 128). Intrigued by the Competition
Commission’s ﬁnding, Dobson and Waterson (2005) have developed a model
that identiﬁes strategic conditions that determine when a chain will set
‘national’ prices that apply uniformly across all of their stores. Uniform




 evidence of the exercise of pricing power because
it ignores local market demand and cost conditions.
Today, the cross-section concentration–price method still has traction, and
as explained below is a serviceable approach for Australia. Supermarket
price research in Australia might begin by determining whether, and how, a
chain varies prices among its stores and the urban areas where it operates. If
scanner data are not available, one can assemble prices on a basket of food
items to compute a price index by resorting to survey research. One could
construct a consumer panel and track food purchases. Alternatively, one can
price check different stores, or monitor media advertisements to measure the
degree of competition via trade promotions in different local market areas.
When combined with measures of market share, concentration, and other
market characteristics that are more readily available, one can provide case
studies if not cross-section econometric analysis of competitive vigour in the
Australian supermarket industry.
With the advent of New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO),
reduced form analysis of market, structure proﬁt and price relationships such
as those discussed above fell out of favour. The Fisher–McGowan critique of
accounting measures of proﬁtability – essentially an assertion that one can
never use accounting proﬁts to measure economic proﬁts – was one of the
primary reasons for the advance of structural econometric NEIO models of
demand and cost conditions to estimate price–cost margins and use them as
indices of market power. NEIO research is often classiﬁed as ﬁrst or second
generation. First-generation studies focus upon the following: homogeneous
products aggregated to the national level, and a census industry category that
is often larger than the relevant antitrust product market. Readily available
data, rather than economic theory or the policy issue, typically drive this
choice. Such aggregate NEIO analysis requires restrictive assumptions that
limit its usefulness for antitrust analysis. To aggregate across ﬁrms, one must
assume a homogeneous product and Gorman polar ﬁrm level cost functions
wherein ﬁrms have constant and identical marginal costs. If one relaxes the
Cournot conduct assumption to estimate a conjectural variation (CV)
parameter, or more generally a ‘market power parameter’, to avoid the recent
critique of CV models (e.g., Kim and Knittel 2004), all ﬁrms in these aggre-
gate homogeneous product models in equilibrium must have the same CV
parameter value. The constant cost and CV power parameter assumptions
imply equal market shares. In fact, in most industries market shares are not
equal. Some CV models estimate a conjectural elasticity parameter. Then, in 
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equilibrium, the product of a ﬁrm’s market share and its CV parameter are
equal across ﬁrms. This means that a large share ﬁrm must have a lower CV,
also an unattractive constraint.
Often NEIO studies must make other assumptions to accommodate
aggregate data. For example, in an analysis of market power in the Austral-
ian retail meat sector Hyde and Perloff (1998) assume that Sydney retail and
wholesale meat prices measure national prices to analyse national meat dis-
appearance data. For a study of retail market power, one would have a more
relevant study if they had found quantity data for Sydney, and analysed mar-
ket power in that well-deﬁned market. This study implicitly assumes that
Sydney meat prices hold in all other Australian cities.
Recent ‘second-generation’ NEIO research goes beyond homogenous
product markets and aggregate industry-level estimation to analyse indi-
vidual ﬁrm- and brand-level pricing conduct in differentiated product markets.
This is the unilateral effects approach introduced earlier. Firm- and brand-
level scanner data for food products permit estimation of a brand-level price
elasticity matrix. To date, most studies focus upon only unilateral effects by
using an estimated demand system to recover price–cost margins and simu-
late a merger impact assuming Nash–Bertrand conduct. Early examples that





for beer and Cotterill (1994) for breakfast cereal. These two studies and
many subsequent brand-level studies (e.g., Nevo 2001) use panel data fea-





 They do not specify and estimate the supply side (ﬁrst-order
conditions) of the oligopoly problem. If one speciﬁes the supply side, that is,
uses classical exogenous cost-shift variables to identify the demand system,
then one can measure coordinated as well as unilateral power effects (e.g.,
Cotterill and Samson 2002). Coca Cola, for example, may elevate prices
because it knows others will follow its lead in addition to elevating prices
because of brand loyalty captured by relatively inelastic demand, holding
other prices constant. In models with a ‘supply side’, one can also test for
alternative pricing games, including Nash–Bertrand or Stackelberg conduct.





  (2000) analysed the demand for aggregate national
brand and private label products with a huge and very comprehensive dataset
from 125 food categories (nearly all packaged grocery products) and 59 local
markets. To pool and compare prices across categories such as apples and
oranges, they used a logarithmic ﬁrst difference model. These data measure
percentage change between 1991 and 1992 in price, quantity, and other vari-
ables, and thus can be pooled across products. On the supply side, they estimate




  For a critique of this approach see Bresnahan (1997). 
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label products. Four-ﬁrm grocery concentration is speciﬁed in both reaction
functions to test for higher price levels in more concentrated local retail markets.
They report a positive and signiﬁcant (5 per cent) relationship between the
percentage change in branded price and the change in grocery concentration
between 1991 and 1992. For private label price, the relationship is positive
and signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level. Moreover, the coefﬁcient in the private
label equation is twice the coefﬁcient in the national brand equation. Super-
market retailers in more concentrated markets use their market position to
increase proﬁts from the sale of private label. This result is consistent with
leading supermarket chains using private label to bargain for lower wholesale
national brand prices and thus optimising proﬁts in the category by increasing




In another second-generation NEIO study, Smith (2004) adapts the
discrete-choice demand model to analyse spatial unilateral pricing power at
the store level by supermarket chains. Smith combines data on known ﬁrm
price–cost margins for the total UK with two other datasets, one on store
characteristics for each supermarket in a smaller study area and the other on
the food shopping behaviour of 115 000 consumers in the study area. He esti-
mates the equilibrium price for each store as well as own and cross-price elas-
ticities at the store level. Smith ﬁnds that demergers in local markets
(splitting up multistore holdings of a chain in local markets) reduce prices
between 2 per cent and 3.8 per cent in the UK markets that he investigates.
Mergers between various pairs of ﬁrms increase prices as much as 7 per cent.
To close his model, Smith makes several restrictive assumptions. For exam-
ple, he assumes that a consumer makes only two shopping trips each week,
one to a supermarket for main needs and one to a convenience store for ﬁll-
in needs, and that these two trips are independent events (Smith 2004, p. 240).
How sensitive his model is to such assumptions is unknown.
This study rejects the Fisher–McGowan critique and uses accounting prof-




  The use of aggregate (at the national UK level)
accounting-based price–cost margins to estimate pricing in individual super-
markets, however, is a far reach. His analysis would beneﬁt from access to




  Most recent research on national brand (NB)–private label (PL) pricing does not focus
on the impact of supermarket concentration or a chain’s market position in a local antitrust
market. It analyses the impact of private label share of category sales on private label and




. 2005 and papers cited therein). One exception is Bon-
nano and Lopez (2005). They analyse NB–PL pricing at the chain level with panel data (24
chains in 10 markets for 58 quad-week periods) and they do specify a chain’s local grocery
market share, a measure of the chain’s market position. Their study, however, is only for one
product category, milk. They ﬁnd no relation between market share and PL or NB whole milk
prices. They ﬁnd that larger market share ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly lower NB prices for reduced




  Nevo (2001) and Hausman (1997) also use accounting price cost margins, but in a different
fashion. 
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Smith’s resurrection of accounting price–cost margins, however, suggests that
examination of price–cost margins at the store, ﬁrm, and market level and
their relationship to market structure is useful if carefully performed. The
impediment of course is access to such sensitive data. Research in this area,
however, is possible if a governmental agency obtains such data and wishes
to have it analysed for policy purposes.
 
3. Vertical market power
 
The sequence of markets and industries between farmers and consumers also
has important implications for antitrust analysis. As in the horizontal dimen-
sion, the two primary dimensions of performance are efﬁciency and market
power.
 
3.1. Vertical pricing games
 
Vertical pricing strategies can take several different forms. The simplest verti-
cal models are those that assume ﬁxed or proportional mark-up conduct by









one uses estimates of the retail demand function to obtain up-channel-





. (2004), however, explain that the FTC now rejects ﬁxed and pro-
portional retail mark-up models when analysing mergers between branded
product manufacturers. They declare: ‘Retailers do not play the passive role
… , i.e., simply marking up the wholesale price of goods to cover their costs’
(p. 368).
Cotterill and Putsis (2001) test for proportional retail mark-up, vertical
Nash, or manufacturer Stackelberg conduct for national brand and private
label products in each of six categories across 59 local markets for 1991 and
1992. They generally reject proportional mark-up behaviour by retailers and
ﬁnd that vertical Nash conduct is more common than manufacturer Stackel-
berg conduct for private label than branded products. This is consistent with
the general understanding that brand manufacturers have more knowledge
about retailers and more pricing power than private label manufacturers.
Several recent studies formally specify and test alternative vertical pricing
models. Cotterill and Dhar (2003) ﬁnd, for ﬂuid milk, that vertical Nash pri-
cing is not signiﬁcantly different from a fully coordinated (vertically inte-
grated) model of pricing. Villas-Boas (2005), for yogurt, rejects vertical Nash
and fully coordinated price in favour of a non-linear pricing model where
manufacturers price at cost on the margin, but extract higher returns from
inframarginal units via ﬁxed fees or a quantity discount scheme. Asker (2005)
examines exclusive dealing contracts in the US beer distribution channel and
ﬁnds no vertical foreclosure effects that damage brewers that do not have
exclusive distribution systems. 
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3.2. Vertical pricing: coalescing power and buyer power
 
With his theory of countervailing power, J.K. Galbraith (1952) argued that
the solution to power on one side of the market was to develop power on the
other side. In the resulting bilateral monopoly situation price, and other
terms of trade, are indeterminant but for bargaining. Walter Adams (1987)
and others, however, have argued that concentration on both sides of a mar-
ket would produce coalescing power, that is, the adversaries would combine
to effectively increase the exercise of power against others in markets up or
down the market channel.
Dobson and Waterson (1997) analyse these two competing hypotheses for
the UK supermarket industry. Their theoretical analysis begins with the
premise that manufacturers and supermarkets are locked in a bilateral
monopoly situation in the wholesale market, that is, countervailing power
exists. When supermarkets also have market power in the retail market, they
demonstrate that coalescing power is the outcome in the wholesale market
and consumers pay higher prices (p. 428). They did not analyse the symmet-
ric issue for the raw product market; however, if manufacturers have buyer
power there one would expect a symmetric result. Coalescing power between
retailers and manufacturers would lower raw product prices to farmers.





. (2005) analysed supermarket buyer power in perisha-
ble fresh produce markets where growers sell directly to supermarkets. They
assume that retailers sell in competitive markets and that retailing marginal
costs, except for the wholesale produce price, are ﬁxed and constant for the
duration of their 2 year sample. Thus, the derived wholesale demand curve is
parallel to the retail demand curve. With this ‘no power at retail’ channel
speciﬁcation they specify a countervailing power bargaining model of imper-
fect competition in the wholesale produce market. It predicts, and they
empirically observe, that the retail–wholesale (farm) price spread increases
with the volume of produce marketed. In their model this is due to increased





scanner data for 20 chains in six cities; however, they aggregated it to
national time series data. A disaggregate, chain-level analysis would provide
interesting detail on the type of chain that is able to exercise buying power.
Also, if one relaxes the perfect competition at retail assumption, their esti-
mated imperfect competition parameter would capture seller as well as buyer
power. In that case, their positive share margin could also be due to seller
power.
The exercise of supermarket buyer power against farmers through food
manufacturers is even more complex. Consider the possibilities of vertical
market foreclosure. First, we describe how vertical foreclosure can affect con-
sumers. Then we will consider its impact on farmers.
A dominant retail ﬁrm can extract cost concessions from a food processor
that effectively force a dominant processor to charge other retailers higher 
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wholesale prices. Rather than use its cost advantage to start a price war at
retail to damage competitors, the advantaged dominant retailer can elevate
prices so that competitors, whose costs are higher, make more not less proﬁts
than before. The dominant ﬁrm’s price leadership scheme also increases its
own proﬁts and the proﬁts of the processor (from higher priced sale to the
retail fringe ﬁrms). This is a coalescing power result against consumers.
This situation has existed in the New England ﬂuid milk market in the




. 2003). Royal Ahold, via its Stop and Shop
supermarket chain, has had a dominant market share at retail (50 per cent)
primarily because of horizontal mergers during the 1990s. In 2000, it closed
its milk plant and negotiated a 20 year strategic alliance with the Dean Foods
milk processing company that thereafter supplied over 80 per cent of New
England supermarket milk.
In 2003, Stop and Shop paid the raw market price plus 53 cents per gallon
for milk delivered into its stores. Competing supermarket chains pay 10 cents
per gallon more for the same supply. Stop and Shop has led prices up so that




1.50 per gallon. In-store marginal
costs are 20–25 cents per gallon and fully allocated costs are 40–50 cents per





gallon as a power premium and the processor earns a share as well.
This coalescing power was also used against farmers. Big Y, a large
regional supermarket chain that initially opted to receive its milk from the
number three ﬂuid processor, recently threatened to switch to the dominant
processor if it could not pay a lower wholesale price. The demand was so
substantial that the processor went to its farmer cooperative supplier and
demanded a lower raw milk price. Agri-Mark, the threatened regional co-op
with over 1400 members, could not sell to Dean Foods because a competing
national cooperative has a nationwide full supply contract with that domin-
ant processor. To keep their ﬂuid market, in this situation, farmers in the
regional cooperative cut price. This is positive proof that when it comes to
the exercise of buyer power against farmers, the truth may often be found in
analysis of the institutional details at the ﬁrm level in relevant antitrust mar-
kets, rather than in aggregate national analysis.
 
3.3. Price transmission in an imperfectly competitive market channel
 
When farm prices drop and retail prices do not follow, policy concerns about
non-competitive food marketing channels surface in agricultural and anti-
trust policy areas. For example, this is a major concern of dairy farmers in




. 2003) and in Australia. In the UK, one of the main
reasons for the Competition Commission study of supermarket retailing
was ‘a public perception of … an apparent disparity between farm and retail
prices … which is seen as evidence by some that grocer multiples were proﬁt-
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In his classic article, Gardner (1975) develops the price transmission model
for a competitive market channel. Gardner demonstrates that even if farm
production and the marketing industry are perfectly competitive and if con-
stant returns to scale exists in marketing, there is not a unique and stable
relationship between farm and retail prices. In other words, there is no sound
economic reason to expect that retail prices should be related to farm prices.
One response to Gardner has been a concerted effort by empirically orientated
economists to ascertain under what more restrictive conditions one could
estimate the relationship between farm and retail prices and be conﬁdent that
the empirical result captured economic behaviour.
The most common approach is Hein’s (1980) model. Hein assumes perfect
competition, constant returns to scale, and ﬁxed proportion production tech-
nology in the marketing industry. He also assumes a perfectly elastic supply
of non-farm inputs to the marketing industry, unidirectional shocks to the
system that emanate from shifts in the farm supply curve, and static equilibrium.
Under these conditions, Hein constructs a ﬁxed-mark-up model for aggre-
gate (vertically integrated) market channel ﬁrms that process and retail product
to consumers (Hein 1980, pp. 11, 14). Since the model has a ﬁxed mark-up,
the price transmission rate depends only on the Leontieff production coefﬁ-
cient for the agricultural input. If it takes one unit (0.5 units) of raw product
to produce a unit of ﬁnished product (e.g., milk) then the price transmission
rate is 100 per cent (50 per cent).
McCorriston (2002) was among the ﬁrst to present a model of price trans-
mission in a non-competitive multistage market channel. He speciﬁed two
successive industries, manufacturing and retailing in a NEIO quantity CV
model; however, he continues to assume a homogeneous product. With linear
demand and constant marginal costs, double marginalisation in this type of
model produces a 50 per cent transmission rate for each monopolist and a 25
per cent channel transmission rate. Logarithmic demand with constant own
price elasticity in conjunction with constant marginal costs always produces
price transmission rates in excess of 100 per cent.
Cotterill (1998) uses Bertrand conduct oligopoly models to analyse price
transmission in a differentiated product market. Price, rather than quantity,
is the strategic choice variable. In these models, a second-order derivative, the
derivative of the own price elasticity, determines whether price transmission
in an oligopoly is less or greater than 100 per cent. Cotterill also ﬁnds that
price transmission is always greater than 100 per cent in non-competitive
markets where a ﬁrm chooses to maximise brand sales given a desired target
level of proﬁts, including a loss leader strategy.
Two important conclusions follow. First, for policy analysis if one assumes
perfect competition in constant cost industries, all beneﬁts of agricultural
policy deregulation ﬂow to consumers when in fact a signiﬁcant portion may
remain with non-competitive channel ﬁrms. Second, one must use a more
ﬂexible demand system to measure market power and price transmission
than the linear, logarithmic, or semilog demand speciﬁcation that is used in 
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many NEIO models. Using an LA/AIDs model and estimation results for the
carbonated softdrink industry, Cotterill (1998, p. 12) shows that cost pass
through rates range from 73 per cent for Royal Crown cola to 107 per cent
for Coca Cola and 110 per cent for private label. Kim (2004) speciﬁes and
estimates a discrete choice demand model for brands of American cheese in
the USA. He reports price transmission rates as low as 30 per cent.
Another functional form that nicely ﬁts price transmission analysis is the





, and different values give different functional forms
ranging from linear (50 per cent) to semilogarithmic (100 per cent) to log–log
(greater than 100 per cent), cost pass through rates. Bettendorf and Verboven
(2000) specify a model with a Box–Cox demand form for the Dutch coffee




. Instead they ﬁx it at the
linear, quadratic, and full logarithmic demand form values, estimate and
compare results. Moreover, their results are not at the brand or ﬁrm level and
the coffee industry is clearly differentiated. They use a Cournot conduct,
homogenous product model at the market level to analyse price transmission
because only aggregate data were available.
 
4. Implications for research
 
Clearly, the most important conclusion from this review of market power in
food marketing channels including the supermarket industry is the need for
disaggregate analysis at the relevant product and geographic market level and
at the ﬁrm or brand level in those antitrust markets. Econometric studies are
certainly desirable; however, case studies of ﬁrm conduct in relevant antitrust
markets also provide credible evidence. If products are differentiated, this
feature should also be incorporated into either type of study.
The Fisher–McGowan critique of accounting proﬁts has always been ques-
tionable. After all if accounting proﬁts say nothing about economic proﬁts
then the world’s capital markets are a fantasy and capitalist economies are
rudderless. Recently three leading NEIO studies have used accounting price–
cost margins. Although out of fashion for 25 years, careful analysis of price–
cost margins at the brand, or ﬁrm, as well as the market level can provide
insight on market power, quality, and efﬁciency questions. Reduced form
models that analyse price levels in local market industries such as super-
market retailing have never gone out of style; however, relatively little research
has been carried out in this area over the past 10 years in Australia or else-
where. The marginal return for research based on manual price checking of a
few ﬁrms across a few local markets could be signiﬁcant.
Research needs to identify and examine the vertical pricing games being
played and evaluate the impact on manufacturer and retail margins, farmers
and consumers. Most of the business-orientated literature on vertical strate-
gic alliances and value chain management focuses only on efﬁciency and
ignores market power. 
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Price transmission in non-competitive market channels needs considerably
more research. One way to proceed would be to compute the price transmission
rates that are implicit in NEIO studies that estimate price–cost margins as
power indices. It would be interesting to reveal the constraints on price trans-
mission in these models. Future NEIO models should be sufﬁciently ﬂexible
to allow for price transmission above or below 100 per cent.
The changing structure of the Australian supermarket industry and
changes in Australian agricultural policies, including deregulation of milk
prices, provide ample opportunity for policy-orientated research along the
avenues discussed in this paper. The performance of large food ﬁrms and
markets in the farm-to-consumer channel is of interest to all stakeholders:
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